An archetype is a recognisable story computed from the register alone — a company's multi-year accounts, its ownership record, its sector baseline. Not a score: a set of conditions you can point at. Counts are live; every pattern has a full page with its exact signature and the play it suggests.
For searchers, funds and advisers originating acquisitions.
founder-led B2B tech at 40–200 staff, growing and structurally profitable, no outside equity on the register — the bootstrapped growth-buyout profile (£5–15m ARR class)
founder-led professional-services firm at scale (accountancy, legal, consultancy, IFA, insurance broking) in a sector PE is actively consolidating — sells well above the base rate
cash is over half of net assets (≥£500k) while headcount stalls — the owner is stockpiling liquidity and winding the business down; the deal can finance itself
a cash-rich owner running a quiet compounder — the two strongest sale signals stacked (well above the base rate); the warmest buyout lead we score
founder-led care / dental / veterinary business at scale in an active consolidation vertical — sells 2.1× the base and almost never fails
founder-led HVAC / electrical / plumbing / fit-out contractor at scale — the trades consolidation theme, sells well above the base rate
net assets have grown three years running with a steady team — a healthy, boring, cash-generative business (sells 1.6× the base, almost never fails): the clean PE / trade acquisition target
retirement-age owner (62+) sitting on cash worth 40%+ of the balance sheet — the pre-sale posture the backtest actually links to a sale (well above the base rate; replaced the weaker 'sunset harvester')
founder-led haulage / warehousing / distribution business at scale in a consolidating vertical — sells well above the base rate
fixed assets ≥£500k on a sound business — suits leveraged, asset-backed or low-equity acquisition structures (ABL, sale & leaseback, machinery refinance)
the fixed-asset base jumped 30%+ in a year — heavy investment that needs asset finance and, the backtest says, often precedes a sale
owner at retirement age (62+) of a real, solvent company — profile, not story: the broad buyout denominator that the story patterns refine (formerly the 'hot' slice)
owner 70+ in sole control of a profitable 15+ year company with no younger generation in the ownership — likely to consider a sale before ever appointing an adviser
the owner has died (estate) or is 70+ with a co-owner who is 65+ — succession skipped a generation and is now due twice over
headcount is still ≤60% of its 2019 level six years on — the owner survived the shock but never rebuilt; playing out, not fighting back
control changed hands 1–6 years ago and the business has shrunk on the new owner's watch (staff −20% or net assets −15% since takeover) — an owner who may not want what they inherited
owner 65+ actively controls 3+ companies and has ALREADY exited at least one — a serial seller mid-divestment; talk about the rest
25+ year old operating company with ZERO charges ever registered and real net assets — unencumbered balance sheet, the deal can be financed against the company itself
a newly incorporated holding company was slotted above the trading company by its own owner — pre-sale / MBO structuring; the approach window is open right now
a 60+ serial owner has ceased control of 2+ companies within 24 months and still holds this one — the divestment is happening now, not someday
fixed assets shrinking while cash grows — the owner is converting the business into money ahead of a deal; sells well above the base rate within a year, and these companies do NOT die (half the pool's failure rate)
a consolidation-vertical player whose owner already shows an exit posture — cash-rich or a clean compounder; the strongest sale cells in the whole backtest, up to well above the base rate within a year
an owner-led business scaling up — 10+ staff and headcount rising two years straight on a solvent balance sheet; growth attracts buyers: sells well above the base rate while failing at half the pool's
For private credit, ABL and refinance originators.
trade debtors ≥£250k while cash tightens on a growing book — the receivables can carry an invoice-finance or ABL facility
land & buildings ≥£500k on the books with little or no secured debt — capital can be raised against the property (commercial mortgage, equity release, bridging)
stock ≥£500k with cash tightening on stable revenue — working capital is trapped on the shelves; inventory finance or ABL frees it
the latest accounting period was lengthened to 15+ months after years of annual filings — the classic 'buy time' move, made 12–18 months before trouble becomes visible
in the Altman distress zone yet carrying real fixed assets — the company survives on its asset base (0.6× the failure rate): an asset-based lending / rescue-finance target, not a walk-away
a ≥25% partner ceased within ~2.5 years and cash fell ≥30% — the company likely bought the partner out of its own pocket; fundamentally sound, drained by the exit — refinance the buyout
two or more independent strain marks (cash −30%, negative working capital, revenue down, loss, overdue accounts) before any formal insolvency event — the intervention window is still open
headcount up ≥25% YoY while cash fell ≥30% and creditors rose — growing faster than it can finance itself; a textbook working-capital borrower
a distressed company that ALSO stretched its accounting period to buy time — hiding a bad year on top of real trouble; fails 3×+ the base rate, the strongest failure signal we score
3+ consecutive years of declining net assets or headcount — no single event a bank would notice, but the trajectory is unambiguous
Altman Z'' in the distress zone (<1.1) — the academically calibrated bankruptcy predictor, computed from the filed balance sheet (plus the P&L where disclosed)
current assets have fallen below short-term creditors and the ratio is still worsening — the classic run-up to a cash crisis (1.7× the failure rate)
balance-sheet insolvent (negative net assets) for 3+ consecutive years yet still trading — living on creditor patience and director loans
headcount down ≥10% YoY while the sector's median headcount is flat or growing — the decline is the company's own, not the industry's; the strongest form of 'shrinking'
net assets negative AND deepening, with outstanding charges and real scale — a leveraged business that burned through its equity and needs to refinance the debt (and often raise fresh equity to keep scaling). Owner age is irrelevant here. Excludes companies whose control changed recently, a tell that the recap already happened.
the owner of a struggling company has incorporated a fresh same-trade company — the pre-pack playbook; creditors of the old shell should move now
a stable zombie whose equity decline is ACCELERATING — each year's drop bigger than the last; fails well above the base rate on 21k company-years, the sharpest big-cell death signal we track